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STATEMENT OF . 1 U R I S D 1 C T I 0 N 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction to review final orders 
in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1989). Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988), 
provides a procedure for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings. This Appeal 
is taken with jurisdiction granted by the above-mentioned sections of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The first issue on appeal is the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) 
(1983), which establishes a nonconsent penalty for non-consenting interest owners. The 
court must decide whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. 
This portion of the statute providing for the nonconsent penalty is unconstitutional on 
its face because it has no rational relationship to a permissible state interest. The taking 
of 150-200% of Mr. Bennioris proportionate share of costs amounts to a "taking without 
just compensation" and therefore the statute itself is unconstitutional on its face and as 
applied. 
The statute is unconstitutional as has been applied in this case because the facts 
indicate that a pooling order was in effect which applies to the entire drilling unit and 
therefore sets the amount of costs to be recouped from Mr. Bennion for drilling the 
second well in the unit. Instead of recouping costs as provided in the pooling order, 
ANR requested that the Board modify the pooling order and subject Mr. Bennion to a 
nonconsent penalty for the costs of the second well. The Board agreed and has ordered 
that such a nonconsent penalty pursuant to statute be applied to Mr. Bennion in this 
case. This is clearly an arbitrary application of the statute to Mr. Bennion. 
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The next issue on appeal is whether or not the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
has authority to modify an existing pooling order, pooling a drilling unit, so that a 
nonconsent penalty can be applied only to a second well in the unit. The standard of 
review with regard to this issue is whether Mr. Bennion has been substantially prejudiced 
by the Agency's action in modifying the existing pooling order to include a nonconsent 
penalty of 175% against him. Mr. Bennion has also been substantially prejudiced by the 
Agency's erroneous interpretation and application of the law with regard to nonconsent 
penalties. The Agency's action is based upon facts not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. The Agency's action was 
also an abuse of discretion delegated to the Agency by statute, contrary to a rule of the 
Agency, contrary to the Agency's prior practice and policy and otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious. 
The fourth issue is whether or not the Board erred in not requiring ANR to make 
a showing of economic feasibility as required by the Board's own order. The standard 
of review is again that the Board's actions were an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the Board and contrary to its own order. 
The final issue on appeal is whether or not the Board's order is violative of the 
Declaration of Public Interest of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. The standard of 
review is that the Board's actions were an abuse of the discretion delegated to the Board 
and contrary to the Board's rules. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & STATUTES 
Constitutional Provisions, 
'•. 1. Article I; Section. ! nl' tlio Constitution of Utah, 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights,] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their 
consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, 
and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right. 
2. Article I; Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
3. Article I; Section 22 Constitution of I'lull. 
Section 22. [Private property for public use,] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation. 
Statutes, 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 4% - (1983). 
40-6-1, Declaration of public interest. 
It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, 
and promote the development, production, and utilization of 
natural resources of oil and gas in the State of Utah in such 
a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide 
for the operation and development of oil and gas properties 
in such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and 
gas may be obtained and that the correlative rights of all 
owners may be fully protected; to provide exclusive state 
authority over oil and gas exploration and development as 
regulated under the provisions of this chapter; to encourage, 
authorize, and provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, 
recycling, pressure, maintenance, and secondary recovery 
operations in order that the greatest possible economic 
recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to 
the end that the land owners, the royalty owners, the 
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producers, and the general public may realize and enjoy the 
greatest possible good from these vital natural resources. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-2(2) (1989). 
40-6-2. Definitions. 
(2) "Correlative rights" means the opportunity of each 
owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable share of 
the oil and gas in the pool without waste. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)&(6) (1953, as amended). 
40-6-6. Drilling units - Establishment - Pooling of interests -
Order - Operation. 
(1) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order the 
establishment of drilling units covering any pool. All such 
orders shall be made upon terms and conditions that are just 
and reasonable. Drilling units shall be of uniform size and 
shape for the entire pool unless the board finds that it must 
make an exception due to geologic or geographic or other 
factors. When necessary the board may divide any pool into 
zones and establish drilling units for each zone, which units 
may differ in size and shape from those established in any 
other zone. The order shall include: 
(a) the acreage to be embraced within each 
drilling unit and the shape of each drilling unit 
as determined by the board but the unit shall 
not be smaller than the maximum area that can 
be efficiently and economically drained by one 
well; and 
(b) the direction that no more than one well 
shall be drilled for production from the common 
source of supply on any drilling unit, and the 
authorized location of the well. 
(2) The board may modify the order to provide an 
exception to the authorized location of the well when the 
board finds such a modification to be reasonably necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool shall 
cover all lands determined by the board to be underlaid by 
the pool, and the order may be modified by the board to 
include additional areas determined to be underlaid by the 
pool. 
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(4) After an order fixing drilling units has been entered by 
the board, the drilling of any well into the pool at a location 
other than authorized by the order, is prohibited. The 
operation of any well drilled in violation of an order fixing 
drilling units is prohibited. The board may modify the order 
to decrease or increase the size of the drilling units or permit 
additional wells to be drilled within the established units. 
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may pool 
their interests for the development and operation of the unit. 
In the absence of voluntary pooling, the board may enter an 
order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for the 
development and operation. The order shall be made upon 
terms and conditions that are just and reasonable. Operations 
incident to the drilling of a well upon any portion of a unit 
covered by a pooling order shall be deemed for all purposes 
to be the conduct of the operations upon each separately 
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That portion 
of the production allocated or applicable to each tract 
included in a unit covered by a pooling order shall, when 
produced, be deemed for all purposes to have been produced 
form each tract by a well drilled thereon. 
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and 
operation of a well on the drilling unit by any owner within 
the drilling unit, and shall provide for the payment of the 
costs, including a reasonable charge for supervision and 
storage facilities, as provided in this subsection. 
In relation to each owner who refuses to agree to bear 
his proportionate share of the costs of the drilling and 
operation of the well (the nonconsenting owner), the order 
shall provide for reimbursement to the owner paying for the 
drilling and operation of the well (consenting owners) for the 
nonconsenting owner's share of the costs out of, and only out 
of, production from the unit attributable to his tract. The 
board is authorized to provide that the consenting owners 
shall own and be entitled to receive all production from the 
well, applicable to each tract or interest, and obligations 
payable out of production, until the consenting owners have 
been paid the amount due under the terms of the pooling 
order or order relating to the drilling unit. In the event of 
any dispute as to such costs, the board shall determine the 
proper costs. The order shall provide that each consenting 
owner shall be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar 
obligations, the share of the production of the well applicable 
to his interest in the unit, and, unless he has agreed 
otherwise, his proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's 
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share of such production until costs are recovered as provided 
in this subsection; and that each nonconsenting owner shall 
be entitled to receive, subject to royalty or similar obligations, 
the share of production from the well applicable to his 
interest in the unit after the consenting owners have 
recovered from the nonconsenting owner's share of production 
the following: 
(a) In respect to every such well 100% of the 
nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of surface equipment 
beyond the wellhead connections (including, but not limited 
to, stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping equipment, and 
piping), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the 
cost of operation of the well commencing with first production 
and continuing until the consenting owners have recovered 
these costs, it being intended that the nonconsenting owner's 
share of these costs and equipment will be that interest which 
would have been chargeable to the nonconsenting owner had 
he initially agreed to pay his share of the costs of the well 
from the beginning of the operation; and 
(b) An amount to be determined by the board but not 
less than 150% nor to exceed 200% of that portion of the 
costs and expenses of staking the location, wellsite 
preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, 
deepening or plugging back, testing, and completing, and the 
cost of equipment in the well (to and including the wellhead 
connections), after deducting any cash contributions received 
by the consenting owners. A reasonable interest charge may 
be included if the board finds it appropriate. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action is an appeal by Respondent, Sam H. Bennion (hereinafter "Mr. 
Bennion"), from an order of the Utah State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (hereinafter 
"Board"), which allowed a modification of the original pooling order establishing the 
rights and duties of the owners of interest in Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 
West, U.S.M., Duchesne County, Utah (hereinafter "Subject Drilling Unit"). The original 
Request for Agency Action requesting modification of the pooling order was by ANR 
Production Company (hereinafter "ANR"), the Petitioner. After argument was held on 
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May 24, 1990, the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining requested that the parties submit 
briefs answering issues propounded by the Division. Briefs were submitted by Petitioner 
and Respondent and also by Amicus Curiae, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association 
(hereinafter "RMOGA"). 
The disposition of the case is that the Board entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on September 20, 1990, modifying the existing pooling order and 
subjecting Mr. Bennion to a penalty of 175% of certain costs of drilling the Miles 2-
1B5 Well (the second well in the unit). The Board applied Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-
6(6)(b) (1983) in rendering its order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Bennion is the record owner of an unleased, undivided one-fourth mineral 
interest in all oil, gas and minerals located in the Northeast Vi, Southwest lA, and 
Northwest V4, Southeast lA of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M., 
Duchesne County, Utah. See Order in Cause No. 139-13 11 3, Exhibit "A". Mr. 
Bennion's interest in said drilling and spacing unit is 2.94898%. All interests in the 
Subject Drilling Unit were pooled for the development and operation of said drilling unit 
and for the protection of correlative rights, effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight 
Time, July 26, 1979. See Order in Cause No. 139-13 11 1, Exhibit "A". The Tew 1-1B5 
Well located in Section 1 of the Subject Drilling Unit was designated as the permitted 
well for said drilling unit. The Tew 1-1B5 Well was completed as a producing well on 
July 7, 1974. See Request for Agency Action, p. 2. The pooling order provided that 
Mr. Bennion was entitled to receive from Shell Oil Company, the original operator of 
the well, his proportionate share of production of oil, gas liquids, and natural gas 
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produced from the Subject Well upon payment of his proportionate share of the monthly 
operating expense of the well. See Order in Cause No. 139-13, pp. 6-7, Exhibit "A". 
Utex Oil Company, on June 25, 1984, acquired all of Shell's interest in the 
Subject Drilling Unit and the Tew 1-1B5 Well. Utex subsequently assigned portions of 
its interest to the parties, including ANR. Utex became the operator of the Tew 1-
1B5 Well. Utex then filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and ANR became the operator of the 
Tew 1-1B5 Well effective December 1, 1986. ANR is presently the operator of the 
Subject Drilling Unit. See ANR's Request for Agency Action, p. 4. ANR, as operator, 
paid Bennion for his share of proceeds of production, less his share of costs for the Tew 
1-1B5 Well. See ANR's Request for Agency Action, p. 4. 
In April 1985 the Board, by Order in Cause No. 139-42, modified the existing 
unitization order so that an additional well could be drilled in the Subject Drilling Unit. 
This order was made pursuant to the 1983 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(2). 
On or about February 6, 1990, ANR commenced drilling the Miles 2-1B5 Well as the 
increased density well for the Subject Drilling Unit. ANR attempted to contract with 
Mr. Bennion with regard to the sharing of the costs of the Miles 2-1B5 Well. The 
contract would have required Mr. Bennion to pay up to 300% of the costs of the second 
well. Mr. Bennion refused to contract with ANR since the Subject Drilling Unit had 
already been pooled and he chose to have his portion of costs determined by that prior 
order. ANR insisted that if Mr. Bennion did not sign a contract with them, he would 
not be able to avoid the nonconsent penalties mandated by the Amended Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (1983). 
ANR filed its Request for Agency Action requesting a modification of the existing 
pooling order for the Subject Drilling Unit on April 10, 1990. ANR requested that the 
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pooling order be modified so that Mr. Bennion would pay 100% of the share of costs 
of surface equipment to be on the wellhead, plus a 100% of the nonconsenting owner's 
share of the costs of the operation of the well and 200% of that portion of the costs 
and expenses of staking and the location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, 
drilling, reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, completing, and the costs of 
equipment in the well, after deducting any cash contributions received by the consenting 
owners. See ANR's Request for Agency Action, pp. 11-12. The Board's order granted 
ANR's relief but made the penalty 175% rather than 200% for the aforementioned costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Bennion's first argument is that the 1983 amendment to the Utah Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act providing for nonconsent penalties is unconstitutional on its face 
and as applied to Mr. Bennion. The statute is unconstitutional on its face because the 
nonconsent penalty is so arbitrary as to have no rational relation to a permissible 
governmental purpose. The statute violates substantive due process and amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking of Mr. Bennion's property without just compensation. 
The nonconsent penalty as applied to Mr. Bennion is unconstitutional. It was 
arbitrarily and capriciously imposed upon Mr. Bennion by the Board. A pooling order 
by the Board in 1981 set the duties and rights of the parties for the entire unit. There 
was no rational basis to modify the order and set a penalty in this case. The order by 
the Board in 1985, allowing a second well to be drilled in the Subject Drilling Unit, 
required that the operator provide, data to the Board regarding the economic feasibility 
of the second well. ANR did not do this and did not provide any information to Mr. 
Bennion prior to asking him to consent to a contract for costs of the second well. Also, 
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the nonconsent penalty was originally devised to distribute the risks taken by operators 
of drilling a dry well In this particular case, ANR took no risk in drilling this second 
well as there was virtually no risk of drilling a dry well. Therefore, the nonconsent 
penalty is not reasonably related to a rational purpose and was not necessary. Applying 
the nonconsent penalty in this case establishes a windfall for ANR. 
Mr. Bennion's third argument is that the Agency's action was based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the Agency, that was not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record. In particular, the Board 
arbitrarily modified the existing forced pooling order in order to apply a nonconsent 
penalty to Mr. Bennion for the costs of the Miles 2-1B5 Well when the rights and duties 
of the parties in the Subject Drilling Unit have already been determined by the original 
pooling order. There was no need to modify the existing pooling order which provided 
for Mr. Bennion to pay his share of costs for any well drilled in the unit. The fact that 
the statute was changed in 1983 to allow for unitization orders to be modified in order 
to allow for the drilling of the second well in the drilling unit, is not enough to support 
modifying the existing pooling order and applying a new nonconsent penalty to Mr. 
Bennion for the second well. 
The Board also did not rely on substantial evidence in its determination in that, 
the 1983 order authorizing a second well in the unit specifically provided that a 
determination of economic feasibility be made prior to drilling. ANR provided no such 
data, but drilled the second well anyway. Mr. Bennion had no factual basis to 
determining whether or not to sign a new contract with ANR so he chose to abide by 
the original pooling order as to the second well. The Board's determination that 
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economic feasibility studies were not necessary, was arbitrary and capricious and not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Mr. Bennion's final argument is that the Agency's action was inconsistent with the 
policy set forth in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act and that the Agency's action was 
otherwise arbitrary and capricious. In the Board and Division of Oil, Gas and Mining's 
Declaration of Public Interest, it was declared that the public interest would be to 
protect the correlative rights of all owners. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (1983). The 
Agency has violated this policy by arbitrarily modifying the existing pooling order when 
there is no evidence to support the assessment of 175% of costs for the drilling of the 
Miles 2-1B5 Well to Mr. Bennion. Mr. Bennion's correlative rights as an owner have 
not been protected nor would this decision as precedent protect other owner's rights in 
similar cases. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE NONCONSENT PENALTY STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE 
Mr. Bennion is an owner in the oil and gas which is being produced by the Miles 
2-1B5 Well. As an owner, he is entitled to his percentage interest in the production of 
the well. The nonconsent penalty applied by the Board requires Mr. Bennion to pay up 
to 175% of the amount of costs which he normally would be required to pay, and in 
instances of a marginally producing well, this penalty would amount to a taking of his 
property without just compensation. In other words, Mr. Bennion has given up his rights 
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to drill in the Subject Drilling Unit and is now being required to pay more than his 
share of the costs of drilling this well 
The 1983 amendments delineate penalties which require nonconsenting owners to 
greater than their share of the costs of drilling a well. When a penalty exceeds the 
amount that the owner is entitled to, the penalty is an unconstitutional taking of 
property without just compensation. The penalties of the Utah statute are discretionary 
with the Board but must be at least 150% and can be up to 200% in some instances. 
The portion of the statute which provides for penalties against the nonconsenting owner 
is unconstitutional on its face. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6)(b) provides that: 
The nonconsenting owner must pay costs to be determined by 
the Board but not less than a 150% nor to exceed 200% of 
that portion of the costs and expenses of staking the location, 
wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, 
reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, and 
completing, and the costs of equipment in the well (to and 
including the wellhead connections), after deducting any cash 
contributions received by the consenting owners. A 
reasonable interest charge may be included if the Board finds 
it appropriate. 
The Board has imposed this nonconsent penalty on Mr. Bennion by modifying the 
original pooling order when the original pooling order, which sets forth the rights and 
duties of Mr. Bennion in the drilling unit, was not affected by the drilling of the second 
well within the unit and had not terminated. 
The statutory risk penalties are not only unconstitutional as a taking of property 
without just compensation in violation of Article I, Section 1 and Article I, Section 22 
of the Utah Constitution, they substantively violate due process rights. While it is true 
that the United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to strike down socioeconomic 
legislation as substantively unconstitutional under the due process clause, it is also true 
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that states have this option if the legislation is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, 
and that the means selected has no real or substantial relationship to the object being 
attained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934). The 
nonconsent penalty statute is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and is devoid of any 
relationship to the object being attained. 
The purpose of the nonconsent penalty is to punish those interest owners who do 
not wish to contract with operators and join in the costs of drilling any well which the 
operator chooses to drill. Operators argue that there may be some risk that the well 
will be a dry one and that interest owners must pay for the drilling of all wells so that 
operators do not lose money when a dry hole is drilled. This does not make sense. 
The operators are privy to all information, geologic and statistical, and have a good 
indication prior to drilling whether there is oil. Shouldn't the interest owners also be 
allowed access to all information and a chance to choose whether they want to take the 
risk of a dry hole? The nonconsent penalty is applied across the board to all 
nonconsenting owners without regard to the risks involved. The penalty has no 
relationship whatsoever to the object to be attained. 
The rights of the property owners must be fully protected and as compensation 
for giving up his right to drill in the drilling unit, Mr. Bennion is entitled to a royalty 
and to his percentage of production after paying his percentage of the costs. Under the 
original forced pooling order, Mr. Bennion is required to pay his portion of the costs 
and receive his portion of the production of the well. Now that the Board has imposed 
a nonconsent penalty on Mr. Bennion by modifying the original forced pooling order and 
changing Mr. Bennion's rights and duties in the unit, Mr. Bennion is required to pay up 
to 175% of his costs and he is required to pay more than any of the other interest 
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owners. This could conceivably be more than is produced by the well and therefore, Mr. 
Bennion would be paying 175% of his costs and receive nothing. Not only is the penalty 
a taking of property without just compensation, it is violative of due process on its face. 
II 
THE NONCONSENT PENALTY IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED IN THIS CASE 
The order of the Board modifying Mr. Bennion's rights and duties in the unit and 
requiring Mr. Bennion to pay a nonconsent penalty of 175% is unconstitutional as 
applied for two reasons. The first reason is that the order, as applied, violates Mr. 
Bennion's due process rights. Any authority of the Board to modify existing orders and 
to set forth new orders is derived from the police power of the State. "The police 
power of the State extends to protecting the correlative rights of owners in a common 
source of oil and gas supply and this power may be lawfully exercised by regulating the 
drilling of wells. . .and distributing the production thereof among the owners. . . ." 
Amoco Prod. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 751 P.2d 203, 207 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) 
["Amoco I"]; (citing, City of Edmund v. Wakefield, 537 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Okla. 1975)). All 
property is held subject to a valid exercise of that police power. Anderson-Pritchard Oil 
Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 241 P.2d 363 (Okla. 1951). Due process is a limitation 
upon the exercise of that police power and is a general requirement that all government 
actions have a fair and reasonable impact on the life, liberty or property of the person 
affected. City of Edmund, 537 P.2d at 1213. Government actions which attempt to work 
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an arbitrary forfeiture of property rights are unconstitutional as violations of due process. 
Amoco I, 751 P.2d at 207, (citing Williams v. Bailey, 268 P.2d 868 (Okla. 1954)). 
When the Board or another agency gives an order such as the one that has been 
appealed here, it is acting in its adjudicative capacity rather than its rulemaking capacity. 
The minimum norms of federal and state due process must govern review of the order. 
Amoco I, 751 P.2d at 207. Here, Mr. Berniion's property rights by operation of law 
under the original forced pooling order were vested at the time the unit was formed. 
Mr. Bennion was paid and costs were recouped from his production for the original well. 
There is no provision for termination or condition for expiration of the original pooling 
order. The arbitrary modification of the original pooling order which is the order on 
appeal here, creates terms and conditions which are not reasonable to Mr. Bennion. 
The modification deprives him of his property rights by requiring him to pay 175% of 
his costs without reasonable justification. Therefore, the order as applied in this case is 
in violation of due process. 
The second reason that the statute, as applied in this case, is unconstitutional is 
that it attempts to impose a nonconsent penalty upon Mr. Bennion in a way that is an 
unconstitutional taking of Mr. Berniion's property without just compensation. Once the 
spacing unit is pooled and the time for elections has passed, the interests become vested 
and beyond the Corporation Commission's reach to modify. The rights are no longer 
vulnerable to extinguishment. Amoco I, 751 P.2d at 207; (citing, Crest Resources v. 
Corporation Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1980)). The Oklahoma statute in Amoco /, 
as well as the Utah statute, requires that owners will receive a just and fair share of 
the oil and gas. The election of the owners to participate or not to participate in the 
unit production must be based upon certain information. In this case, as well as in 
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Amoco /, good faith elections were made prior to the drilling of the first well. Mr. 
Bennion, at that time, chose to be a nonconsenting interest owner and have his interests 
forced pooled by order of the Board. It is not fair or just to alter the positions of the 
interest owners after the initial well is drilled. Amoco I> 751 P.2d at 207. Once the 
operator relies on the unit order that the Corporation Commission creates, new elections 
deprive the original risk capital investors of rights earned by taking the risk of the initial 
well. Id The order of the Commission in the Amoco case, granting a second election, 
was considered to be a depravation of a property right of the initial risk capital 
investors. Therefore, they did not recover their just and fair share of the production. 
Id 
Mr. Bennion's situation is virtually identical to the situation set forth in Amoco 
L In that case, the unit was originally forced pooled by the Corporation Commission 
delineating all the rights and duties of the owners of the unit. The operator relied on 
that particular order in drilling the first well in the unit. All of the owners also relied 
on the forced pooling order in making their election whether to participate or not 
participate in the unit. The Commission, by order, granted a second election to the 
investors. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals in reviewing that order found that the 
second election was a deprivation of property rights of the initial risk capital investors 
and that this amounted to a taking without just compensation. The same situation exists 
in this case. The original forced pooling order, pooling the interests in the unit and 
pooling Mr. Bennion's interests in the unit as of 1979, set forth all of the rights and 
duties of the investors in the unit. The new order, modifying the existing pooling order, 
imposed new duties on Mr. Bennion which were not just or reasonable. Mr. Bennion 
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cannot now recover his just and fair share of the production in the unit because he has 
no choice but to pay the 175% nonconsent penalty which the Board has imposed upon 
him. 
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas has also looked at the issue of just and 
reasonable elections by interest owners in a unit. Windsor Gas Corp. v. Railroad 
Comm'n of Texas, 529 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). In that case, the owners 
of the two-thirds mineral interest appealed from a Railroad Commission's decision which 
denied owners eight applications to force another owner to pool under the mineral 
interest pooling act. Id. at 835. The court held that, "[t]he appellant's offer for the 
initial drilling of eight drilling units on a take-it-all or leave-it-all basis, and with a 2-1 
risk factor, was not a fair and reasonable offer to voluntarily pool." Id. at 837. It was 
clear to the court from the language of the Texas Oil and Gas Act that "a fair and 
reasonable offer" must be fair and reasonable from the standpoint of the party being 
forced pooled. Consequently, the court ruled that the forced pooling order with the 2-
1 risk factor was not fair and reasonable. Id. at 837. The court's decision partially rests 
on the fact that the operators were not taking any risks in drilling the wells. The risk 
factor was established at about 84.6% success factor. The court held that the authority 
in the field that in evaluating an offer to pool voluntarily, a risk penalty in excess of 
2-1 (the maximum risk penalty the Railroad Commission is authorized to impose), may 
be presumptively unfair. Id. Therefore, it appears that, in evaluating whether or not a 
pooling order is fair and reasonable, the Commission or Board must take into account 
the risk factors. When the risk factor of drilling a well is low, it is unconstitutional and 
unfair to set a high nonconsent penalty for the nonconsenting interest owner. 
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In In re Kohlman, 263 N.W.2d 674, 675 (S.D. 1978), the South Dakota Supreme 
Court concluded that the purpose of imposing a risk penalty on nonconsenting working 
interest owners is to, "relieve the nondrilling interest owner from having to advance his 
proportionate share of the drilling costs, but provide extra compensation from production 
(if oil is found) to the drilling party who had advanced the entire costs of a dry hole." 
The problem in applying the nonconsent penalty statutes is that not all wells carry with 
them the same risk of coming up totally dry or insufficiently productive to payoff drilling 
and operating expenses. B. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options 
in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, J. Energy L. & Pol'y, 265 (1986). The leading 
factor in calculating the penalty must be the likelihood or unlikelihood that oil or gas 
will be found at the well's proposed location. Id. at 267. Therefore, the Agency must 
determine the penalty by taking into account the likelihood or unlikelihood of a dry well 
in the unit. In this case, that was not done. Since ANR did not provide any 
information of economic feasibility for the second well to the Board or to Mr. Bennion, 
no reasonable investigation of the risks of a dry hole could be made by the Board prior 
to imposing upon Mr. Bennion the 175% penalty. In fact, the risk of drilling a dry hole 
in this particular unit, at this particular location, was practically zero. 
As was mentioned above, in the Windsor case, the court held that there was 
essentially no risk in the drilling activities and therefore, an offer to have a 100% 
penalty in excess of actual costs was not fair and reasonable. Windsor, 529 S.W.2d at 
836-837. In the Kohlman case, the court reviewed a Commission's determination that a 
100% penalty was reasonable, even though the operator had sought a 250% penalty and 
the nonconsentor had apparently agreed in private negotiations to a 150% penalty. 
Because a successful well was located about three quarters of a mile from the proposed 
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wellsite, a smaller risk penalty should have been imposed because the risk of a dry hole 
was less. Kohlman, 263 N.W.2d at 679. The court ultimately concluded that the 
Commission's 100% penalty was reasonable even though it was a smaller penalty than 
the nonconsentor had voluntarily agreed to. 
In the hearing before the Board in this matter, which was held on May 24, 1990, 
counsel for Mr. Bennion questioned David M. Laramie, who was called as a witness on 
behalf of ANR Production Company. During the questioning, counsel asked Mr. 
Laramie whether or not Coastal or ANR or any of the operators of the subject drilling 
unit had drilled any dry holes in that particular unit. In answer to that question, Mr. 
Laramie stated that, "[t]hey have drilled uneconomic wells, but I am not sure they've 
drilled dry holes." See Transcript of May 24, 1990 hearing, p. 29. When asked what 
wells Mr. Laramie was referring to as uneconomical, Mr. Laramie stated that, in that 
particular unit, "[tjhere are no uneconomical wells." See Transcript of May 24, 1990 
hearing, p. 30. Mr. Laramie went on to state that, "[i]n all of. . .this is Duchesne 
County, and in Duchesne County there are no dry holes that we have drilled." See 
Transcript of May 24, 1990 hearing, p. 30. Obviously, the risk of drilling a dry hole in 
the subject drilling unit is practically zero and the risk of drilling an unproductive well 
is very low. These factors should have been taken into account in any determination of 
a nonconsent penalty against Mr. Bennion. 
The Board arbitrarily and capriciously imposed a 175% penalty against Mr. 
Bennion for costs of the second well when the original pooling order was still in affect. 
The Board should not have modified the pooling order in the first place, and when they 
did, the Board failed to take in account any risks in modifying the order. The Board's 
decision to modify the order was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by 
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substantial evidence. Since Mr. Bennion is being assessed a very high penalty when in 
fact the risks of drilling a dry well in this area were virtually zero, this is, in essence, a 
taking of Mr. Bennion's property without just compensation. The Board, in applying the 
nonconsent penalty statute to Mr. Bennion applied the statute unconstitutionally. 
Ill 
THE BOARD WAS IN ERROR IN 
MODIFYING THE ORIGINAL 
POOLING ORDER 
A. The Statute does not Allow for Modification of the Pooling Order in this case. 
The Board has made an error in applying the nonconsent penalty statute to the 
facts of this case. The substantial evidence test has not been met with regard to this 
issue. The statute at issue here provides that, "[a] pooling order shall permit the drilling 
and operation of the well on a drilling unit by any owner within the drilling unit, and 
shall provide for the payment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for the 
supervision and storage facilities." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (1983). The original 
pooling order of 1981 provided for drilling and operation of the wells in the unit and for 
payment of the costs by Mr. Bennion. 
The statute also states that, "[I]n relation to each owner who refuses to agree to 
bear his proportionate share of the costs of the drilling and operation of the well (the 
nonconsenting owner), the order shall provide for reimbursement to the owner paying for 
the drilling and operation of the well (consenting owner) for the nonconsenting owner's 
share of the costs out of, and only out of, production from the unit attributable to his 
tract." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (1983) [Emphasis added]. The original pooling 
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order did, in fact, provide for Mr. Bennion, as a nonconsenting owner, to reimburse the 
consenting owners out of his share of production. This is exactly what was done for the 
first well drilled in the unit. 
The statute goes on to state that, M[I]n the event of any dispute as to such costs, 
the Board shall determine the proper costs." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (1983). The 
Board may then apply the nonconsent penalty statute in order to resolve the dispute as 
to the costs. This would be the only time that the nonconsent penalty statute would 
apply. In this case, there is no dispute as to the costs and, therefore, the nonconsent 
penalty statute should not be applied. The original pooling order applies to the entire 
unit and applies to both the original well in the unit and the second well in the unit. 
Mr. Bennion has paid his share of costs for the original well and will pay his share for 
the second well under the original pooling order. There is no dispute as to the costs 
and, therefore, the nonconsent penalty statute should not have been applied by the 
Board. 
B. The Original Pooling Order Applies to the Entire Unit and Not to a Single Well, 
The Board was in error in modifying the original pooling order in order to assess 
a nonconsent penalty to Mr. Bennion for costs on the second well. The substantial 
evidence test was not met as to this issue. The evidence presented below shows that 
the original pooling order pooled the interests for the entire unit and that there was no 
reason to modify the original pooling order merely because a second well was drilled in 
the unit. The original pooling order, Order in Cause No. 139-13, states that, M[a]ll 
interests in the drilling unit comprised of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
U.S.M., in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County, Utah, be and the same are pooled 
for the development and operation of said drilling unit and for the protection of 
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correlative rights, effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight Time, July 26, 1979. See 
Order in Cause No. 139-13, p. 6, Exhibit "A". [Emphasis added]. The 1985 order 
allowing for a second well to be drilled in the Subject Drilling Unit, Order in Cause No. 
139-42, states as follows: 
It is not the intent of this order, in permitting additional wells 
to be drilled on established drilling units, to change or amend 
the existing contractual rights or relationships, express or 
implied, of any parties who share in production or the 
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area. 
This language proves that the Board's intention, in allowing a second well to be drilled 
in the unit, was not to disturb the previously established rights and duties of the owners 
of the unit. Prior to the May 1990 hearing below, the parties were asked by the Board 
to provide answers to questions which the Board thought were at issue. One of the 
questions asked by the Board was whether or not the nonconsent penalty applies to the 
unit or to a single well. In answer to that question, the Amicus Curiae stated as follows, 
"The Board's forced pooling order pools all interest in the drilling unit for the life of 
that unit and not merely the interest in the wellbore." See Amicus Brief, p. 10. The 
Amicus cites the statutory provision regarding unitization which supports its contention 
that pooling is for the drilling unit and not for each well. The pertinent language is as 
follows: 
When two or more separately owned tracts are embraced 
within a drilling unit...[and] [i]n the absence of voluntary 
pooling, the Board may...enter an order. Pooling all interests 
in the drilling unit for the development and operation thereof. 
See Amicus Brief, p. 10, (citing, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) (1983)). The Amicus states 
that, although the 1983 Act does not expressly provide that an interest once forced 
pooled remains forced pooled, that conclusion follows "a fortiori." The Amicus also 
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states that the "forced pooling order operates from the date of its entry, presumably until 
production ceases, the drilling unit is disestablished, or a nonconsenting owner 
subsequently voluntarily joins in the drilling of a subsequent well. Forced pooling the 
lands (the drilling unit), as opposed to the well, avoids multiple hearings and promotes 
certainty in allocating costs and proceeds of production." See Amicus Brief, p. 11. 
Interestingly, ANR's Memorandum in answer to the Board's questions states that, 
"[i]t should be clearly understood that the order of April 30, 1981 pools Bennion's 
interest for the entire unit, not just for the initial well, the Tew 1-1B5 Well. In other 
words, the order dated April 30, 1981 pools Bennion's interest for all wells to be drilled 
in the Subject Drilling Unit." See ANR Memorandum, p. 5. ANR goes on to note 
that, "[Consequently, the Utah forced pooling statute applies unit-wide, not on a 
wellbore basis." See ANR Memorandum, p. 6. Nothing has happened in this case to 
terminate the original pooling order and, therefore, the original pooling order applies to 
the entire unit and the rights and duties set forth in the original order apply to the 
second well in the unit. The Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, in answer to the Board's 
questions, also submitted a memorandum and, in that memorandum, stated that the 
primary purpose of a pooling order is to determine the interest of each owner and fix 
the amount of drilling and operational costs. See Division Memorandum, p. 2. 
The case law is quite clear on the issue of whether or not a pooling order applies 
to the entire unit or separately to each well in the unit. Although there are no Utah 
cases on point, Oklahoma has provided a wealth of information as to this issue. The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma established the general principles with regard to unitization 
of an oil field and pooling of the owner's shares of income, investment and expense. 
Ward v. Corporation Comm'n, 501 P.2d 503, 507 (Okla. 1972). The court stated, "[0]ne 
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type of order establishes spacing (drilling) units of a certain size over what appears to 
be a common source of supply and fixes the well location within the unit." Then, the 
court went on to recite the definition of a pooling order which provides that, "[T]he 
various owners may pool their interest, i.e. agree upon each owner's share of income, 
investment and expense, and if they cannot agree the commission upon application will 
make that decision for them." Id. The court held that the Oklahoma statute providing 
for unitization and pooling of oil interests must be interpreted as follows, "[T]hat the oil 
and gas lessees and others who own interest in the spacing (drilling) unit, share in the 
production of the unit well held before or after the spacing (drilling) unit is established 
as of the time the unit is established." Id. 
In a 1986 case, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma looked at the issue of whether 
the Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma has the authority to force pool 
by the wellbore instead of forced pooling by the drilling and spacing unit. Amoco I, 
751 P.2d at 203. Amoco and R & R Exploration Company, Inc., applied to the 
Corporation Commission to force pool the drilling rights of oil and gas interests in a 
unit. The Commission pooled the unit. R & R Exploration Company wrote a letter to 
Amoco, the operator, and elected not to participate in the drilling of the designated well 
in the unit. After R & R elected not to participate, it assigned its interest to Bartex 
Exploration, Inc. Amoco drilled and completed a first well in the unit, and, fourteen 
months later, drilled another well. Bartex then informed Amoco that it would 
participate in the second well. Amoco insisted that the original pooling and election of 
R & R eliminated R & R and Bartex's participation in the subsequent wells in the 
unit. The Commission ruled that Bartex had the right to participate in subsequent wells 
in the spacing unit because the fourteen month period between the two wells was 
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enough time to separate the two wells in such a fashion so that the second well could 
not be construed as a continuation of drilling operations. Id. at 205. On appeal, the 
court reversed. 
The Court of Appeals held that the decision of the Corporation Commission did 
not follow the pooling statutes enacted by the Oklahoma Legislature. Id. at 205. The 
statute, which is similar to the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, provided for owners 
to unitize an oil field in order to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, and/or to 
protect correlative rights. Id. at 206. The court held that the statute mandated 
developing the spacing unit as a unit and that, after a spacing order was entered, the 
unit could be forced pooled. The court further held that this pooling was for unit 
development. A forced pooling order unitizes the working interest in the entire unit as 
to the named formations. Id. The appellees and the Corporation Commission were in 
effect authorizing pooling by the wellbore by changing the original pooling order because 
a second well was drilled in the unit. The court interpreted a previous Oklahoma case 
and held that the regulation pooling several drilling and spacing units was restrictive and 
that pooling is by the drilling and spacing unit and not by the wellbore. The previous 
court had stated: 
When the statute says the Commission shall require the 
owners to pool and develop their lands in the spacing unit as 
a unit it is limiting pooling within the designated drilling and 
spacing unit of 640 acres...[W]e feel the regulatory statute is 
restrictive. 
Id., (citing, Helmerich & Payne, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n, 532 P.2d 419 (Okla. 1975)). 
The Amoco I Court held that the rule applies not only when the Corporation 
Commission pools more than a single drilling and spacing unit but also when the 
Corporation Commission tries to limit pooling to a single wellbore. Id. at 206. 
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The court in Amoco I further stated that, "Pooling by the wellbore is not just and 
reasonable." Id. at 207. The Court of Appeals, citing Crest Resources v. Corporation 
Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1980), stated that the Supreme Court had previously said, 
"Once the spacing unit is pooled and the time for elections has passed, the interest 
becomes vested and beyond the Corporation Commission's reach to modify. The rights 
are no longer vulnerable to extinguishment." Id. The court also indicated that the 
statute requires that the owners receive a just and fair share of the oil and gas. The 
original election is based upon certain information or lack of information and good faith 
elections were made prior to the first well. It is therefore, not fair or just to alter the 
positions of the interest owners after the initial well is drilled. Id. 
In 1987, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma again looked at the same issue. The 
Commission had established a 640 acre drilling and spacing unit for various common 
sources of supply of oil and gas. The pooling order provided for an election by the 
owners of interest in the drilling and spacing unit. Amoco Production Co. v. Corporation 
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 835, 836 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987), [Amoco II"]. One of the owners in 
the unit, Samedan Oil Corporation, elected to accept the cash bonus plus override, in 
lieu of participation. Amoco, who was again the operator of the unit, requested 
authorization from the Commission to drill an additional well on the drilling and spacing 
unit. The second well was authorized by the Commission. Amoco drilled the additional 
well and, after completion of the second well, Samedan filed its application requesting 
the Commission to adjudicate the rights and equities of the parties pertaining to the 
second well. The issue, again, was whether the original pooling order was effective as 
to the second increased density well. Id. at 836. The Commission found that the 
original pooling order was inapplicable to the additional well drilled by Amoco. Id. 
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The court vacated the Commission's order. The court, in vacating the order of the 
Commission, stated that the order, in effect, "allows pooling by the wellbore, and not by 
the unit and that this is beyond the Commission's authority." Id. at 837. The court held 
that the Corporation Commission was without authority to force pool by the wellbore. 
Id. 
In 1988, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Corporation Commission, by 
repooling a previous pooled 640 acre drilling and spacing unit made an error in law and 
exceeded its jurisdiction. Inexco Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 767 P.2d 404 
(Okla. 1988). In that case, the Corporation Commission had, by order, created a 640 
acre drilling and spacing unit and had forced pooled the spacing unit pursuant to a 
pooling order. The pooling order required the owners to either participate by paying 
their share of the costs of drilling and completing the well or elect to accept a bonus. 
Ward Petroleum accepted the bonus. Vierson Oil & Gas also accepted the bonus. The 
order named Inexco as the operator. Inexco drilled one well in the unit and then 
planned to drill an increased density well in the same unit. A dispute arose between 
Inexco and Ward as to where the increased density well should be located, whether to 
apply to the Corporation Commission to repool Section 23, and whether Ward could be 
designated the operator. Id. at 405. The hearing officer concluded that the original 
pooling order forced pooled only the initial well and not the unit. The Commission 
upheld the hearing officer's report. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the hearing 
officer's finding was erroneous because the second pooling order forced pooled only the 
well and not the unit. 
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Once Ward and Vierson had elected to accept a bonus and once the election 
period had passed, the property interest of the affected parties vested. Id. Once vested, 
the property rights of the parties were beyond the reach of the Commission's power to 
modify. See also, Renola Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 752 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Okla. 
1988) Crest Resources v. Corporation Comm'n, 617 P.2d 215, 218 (Okla. 1980). The 
court further held that, "The power to change a previous order requires the showing 
before the Commission of a change in conditions or knowledge of conditions 
necessitating the repeal, amendment or modification. Failure to make such a showing 
renders an attempt to modify a prior order subject to the prohibition on collateral 
attacks forced by the legislature. . . ." Id. at 406. In the Inexco case, the court also held 
that there was no evidence of changed conditions even though, in that case, as there is 
in the Bennion case, a second well had been drilled in the unit. The court held that the 
presence of the drilling of the second well along with the fact that one of the parties 
wished to change his status and become the operator of the new well, were not 
substantial circumstances of change such that a modification of the order could be made. 
The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma derives its pooling authority by statute 
as does the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in Utah. The Oklahoma statute provides, in 
part, "Where, however, such owners have not agreed to pool their interests and where 
one such separate owner has drilled or proposes to drill a well on said unit to the 
common source of supply, the Commission. . .[may] require such owners to pool and 
develop their lands in the spacing unit as a unit." Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (1984 
Supp.). The court, in Amoco II, stated that Section 87.1 does not provide for pooling 
by the wellbore, but limits one well per spacing unit and that the owners pool and 
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develop their lands in the spacing unit as a unit. The restrictive nature of 87.1 requires 
pooling by the unit and cannot and does not, authorize pooling by the wellbore. Amoco 
IIy 752 P.2d at 837. 
The Utah statute is similarly restrictive. The statute provides, "Two or more 
owners within a drilling unit may pool their interests for the development and operation 
of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the Board may enter an order pooling 
all interests in the drilling unit for the development and operation." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 40-6-6(5) (1983) [Emphasis added]. The Utah statute should be interpreted as 
Oklahoma has interpreted its statute. The most likely interpretation of the Utah statute 
is that it requires pooling by the unit of the entire unit and not of each well. The 
Amoco II case has been cited as the general rule in oil and gas law that compulsory 
pooling must be by the unit, and not by the well. B. Kramer & P. Martin Patrick, The 
Law of Pooling and Unitization, § 13.04 (3rd ed. 1990). 
Therefore, the facts presented to the Board below overwhelmingly support a view 
that pooling of a unit is for the entire unit and not to be done on a well to well basis. 
There is substantial evidence to support this view and the Board was in error in 
determining that it could modify an existing pooling order for the entire unit so that a 
nonconsent penalty could be applied only to the second well, thereby pooling by the 
wellbore and not by the unit. 
C. The Board Did Not have Authority to Modify the Original Pooling Order. 
The Board has the authority to modify or amend a unitization order according to 
statute. The Board does not, however, have the authority to amend a pooling order by 
statute. The applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 sets forth the procedures for 
establishing drilling units and also for the pooling of the unit. Section 1, which sets 
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forth the procedure for establishing drilling units provides, "(1) The Board of Oil, Gas 
and Mining, may order the establishment of drilling units covering any pool." Sections 
2, 3, and 4 set forth the procedures for modifying the drilling unit. Those modifications 
allowed by statute of the unitization order include: 
(2) The Board may modify the order to provide an exception 
to the authorized location of a well when the Board finds 
such a modification to be reasonably necessary. 
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool shall cover 
all lands determined by the Board to be underlayed by the 
pool, and the order may be modified by the Board to include 
additional areas determined to be underlayed by the pool. 
(4) After an order fixing drilling units has been entered by 
the Board the drilling of any well in the pool at a location 
other than authorized by the order is prohibited. The 
operation of any well drilled in violation of an order fixing 
the drilling unit is prohibited. The Board may modify the 
order to decrease or increase the size of the drilling units or 
permit additional wells to be drilled within the established 
units. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(2), (3) & (4) (1953, as amended). 
The procedure for pooling the interest in a drilling unit is included in Section 5 
of the Act. There is nothing in that section indicating that a pooling order may be 
modified or amended. Section 5 provides as follows: 
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may pool their 
interest for the development and operation of the unit. In 
the absence of voluntary pooling, the Board may enter an 
order pooling all interests in the drilling unit for the 
development and operation. The order shall be made upon 
terms and conditions that are just and reasonable. Operations 
incident to the drilling of a well upon any portion of the unit 
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covered by a pooling order shall be deemed for all purposes 
to be the conduct of the operations upon each separately 
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That portion 
of the production allocated or applicable to each tract 
included in a unit covered by a pooling order shall, when 
produced, be deemed for all purposes to have been produced 
from each tract by a well drilled thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) (1983). According to the statute, the unitization order may 
be modified in order for additional wells to be drilled, location of wells to be changed 
or spacing of wells to be changed. The pooling order cannot, under the statute, be 
modified. The pooling order delineates the contractual or noncontractual rights of the 
owners of the unit. Once the rights of the owners have been established in the pool, 
there is no need to amend the pooling order because the rights of those parties do not 
change over time. 
The unitization order was modified on April 17, 1985 allowing for the second 
well to be drilled in the unit. See Order in Cause No. 139-42, Exhibit "B". This had no 
affect on the validity or the conditions of the original pooling order. It merely allowed 
the Board to exercise its authority to increase the number of wells, change the spacing 
order or change the location of the wells in the unit. As was mentioned above, the 
order which allowed the modification of the original unitization order specifically states 
in Section E that: 
E. It is not the intent of this order, in permitting additional 
wells to be drilled on established drilling units, to change or 
amend the existing contractual rights or relationships, express 
or implied, of any parties who share in production or the 
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area. 
See Order in Cause No. 139-42, p. 8, Exhibit "B". It is quite clear that the Board, in 
exercising its authority to amend the unitization order, realized that it did not have the 
authority to change the contractual rights or relationships of the parties in doing so. 
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Mr. Bennion holds mineral interests which, without his consent, were made part 
of an oil drilling unit designated by the Board in 1972. As a nonconsenting interest 
owner, Mr. Bennion is entitled under statute to his proportionate share of the oil and 
gas produced from the unit minus his proportionate share of the costs of drilling, 
production, and maintenance. Bennion v. Gulf Oil Corp., 716 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah 1986). 
In Bennion, the Utah Supreme Court held that Mr. Bennion was entitled to his 
proportionate share of the oil and gas produced from the unit minus his proportionate 
share of the costs at the time the drilling unit was designated and begin producing. Id. 
The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has also stated that, "The statute allows the 
nonconsenting owners certain property rights which become effective when oil is 
produced upon a drilling unit." Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Min., 675 P.2d 
1136, 1142 (Utah 1983), (citing Order in Cause No. 139-18). While the Petitioner may 
request the Board to enforce those rights, they do not lie dormant until triggered by a 
Petition. Since Mr. Bennion's rights and entitlements to production arise from the time 
of production, it follows that the statutory authority for enforcing those rights comes 
from the statute in effect at the time the rights vest. The nonconsent penalty was not 
added to the statute until 1983 and, therefore, would have no affect on the unitization 
of this unit nor on Mr. Bennion's rights to production. Therefore, the change in the 
statute is not a change of circumstances such that the original pooling order needs to be 
revised. 
Normally a unit order may not be revised or changed unless there is a change of 
circumstances, such as new evidence becoming available regarding geologic and 
engineering conditions of the reservoir or common source of supply. B. Kramer & P. 
Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, § 14.02 (3rd ed. 1990). Typical revisions 
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of unitization orders include the following: the size of the unit may be enlarged or 
reduced, or the shape of the unit may be changed; a well location may be changed; 
additional wells within the unit may be authorized, creating a substitute unit well or an 
alternate unit well; the reservoir may be reclassified; or the unit operator may be 
changed. Id. This treatise on pooling and unitization indicates the various ways that 
unitization orders may be changed by the Board. It should be noted that the typical 
revisions include only revisions to the unitization order. There is no mention made of 
a modification of a pooling order or the authorization of the Board to modify a pooling 
order so that the contractual or noncontractual rights of the parties be altered. As the 
statute in Utah indicates, the modifications which were intended by the legislature 
include modification of the unitization order so that various spacing of wells, addition of 
wells and well locations may be changed. There is nothing in the Utah statute or 
otherwise mentioned in the law of oil and gas that a Board may modify an existing 
pooling order such as the Board did in this case. The Board was clearly outside the 
parameters set forth by statute and by law in modifying this particular pooling order. 
The Board has thus abused its discretion and overstepped any authority which it had by 
changing the existing contractual rights of the parties in this matter. Moreover, this 
change in the pooling order and the change in circumstances which is necessary for any 
type of order to be changed, is not supported by substantial evidence in this particular 
case. ^ 
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IV 
THE 1985 ORDER REQUIRES THE 
OPERATOR TO MAKE A SHOWING TO 
THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY 
PRIOR TO DRILLING A SECOND WELL 
ANR, as operator of the wells in the unit, violated the order of the Board dated 
April 17, 1985, which provided that economic feasibility be shown prior to drilling the 
second well. Section C of the Order states: 
Additional wells may be drilled at the option of the operator 
of the unit, based upon geologic and engineering data for that 
unit which will justify the drilling of an additional well in 
order to recover additional oil, provided the additional well 
appears to be economically feasible. 
Section D of the Order defines economic feasibility as follows: 
Economic feasibility means that a prudent operator would 
have a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of drilling, 
completing, producing and operating the well, plus a 
reasonable profit. 
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; Order in Cause No. 139-42, Exhibit "B". 
There is no question that the Board was seeking, by its Order, to obtain 
geological data with which to justify the drilling of an additional well in the unit. The 
Order stated that, "An additional well could be drilled at the option of the operator 
provided the well appears to be economically feasible." [Emphasis added]. This 
statement by the Board indicates that the Board was requiring a showing of economic 
feasibility prior to the drilling of the second well. 
However, ANR did not provide geological data prior to drilling the second well. 
ANR provided no data, no geological or engineering studies for the unit to justify the 
drilling of the second well on the unit. ANR provided nothing to the Board to justify 
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the drilling of the second well nor did it provide any information to Mr. Bennion. ANR 
did ask Mr. Bennion to participate in the drilling costs of the second well under contract 
and to pay approximately 300% of those costs. Mr. Bennion had no information with 
which to base his decision to enter or not enter a contractual arrangement with ANR 
for the second well. Mr. Bennion's intent was to participate in the second well as he 
did in the first well under the forced pooling order entered into in 1981 setting for the 
rights and duties of the parties as to the entire unit. Therefore, Mr. Bennion did not 
enter into a contractual arrangement with ANR for the costs of the second well. Since 
ANR did not find it necessary to provide economic feasibility data to the Board or to 
Mr. Bennion so that he could make an informed decision as to changing his contractual 
rights in the unit, Mr. Bennion chose not to change his position and to follow the 
original forced pooling order as to the second well. ANR was in violation of the 1985 
order of the Board in not providing the economic feasibility data as it was required to. 
The Board was attempting to follow its philosophy and public interest policy by 
protecting the correlative rights of the owners of the mineral interests and providing that 
no waste of mineral interests be allowed when it ordered that economic feasibility studies 
be done prior to the drilling of the second well. The economic feasibility studies would 
have provided the justification for drilling which correlates exactly with the intent and 
purpose of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. Therefore, ANR not only violated the 
1985 Order of the Board, it is also contradicted the Declaration of Public Interest which 
is the basis of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
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V 
THE BOARD'S ORDER IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE STATUTORY 
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
The Declaration of Public Interest contained in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act 
provides in part as follows, "It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, 
encourage, and promote the development, production, utilization of natural resources in 
the State of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide 
for the operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a 
greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained and that the correlative rights 
of all owners may be fully protected...." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (1983) [Emphasis 
added]. Correlative rights means, "The opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce 
his just and equitable share of the oil and gas in the pool without waste." Utah Code 
Ann. § 40-6-2(2) (1989). 
One of the goals of the statute is to protect owners' correlative rights, or in other 
words, to protect each owner's opportunity to produce his just and equitable share of the 
oil and gas in the pool. The statute also provides that the Board and Division of Oil, 
Gas and Mining may establish drilling units which allow for the drilling of one or two 
wells within a unit by an operator and, in effect, take away the individual owner's 
opportunity to drill their own wells in the unit. Owners must then be compensated for 
giving-up their right to drill in the unit. With regard to this denial of individual owner's 
rights to produce or drill their own wells on their land, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
has held that, 
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To impose this denial without granting a right to participate 
in production of the unit well, as of the time the non-drilling 
owners were prohibited from drilling, is the taking by the 
state of their property without due process in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
Ward, 501 P.2d at 507. In order to comply with this due process requirement and make 
sure that the owners have a share of the production in a unit, a unitization order is 
entered fixing the well location within the unit and a pooling order may be entered 
fixing the owner's share of income, investment and expenses for the unit. The owner's 
interest in the unit is established at the time the unit is established. 
The Subject Drilling Unit was established by Order in Cause No. 139-3 entered 
June 24, 1971 and amended by Order in Cause No. 139-8 entered September 20, 1972. 
By this Order, the Board established the Subject Drilling Unit as a drilling and spacing 
unit for the production of oil, gas and associated hydro-carbons from the spaced interval 
described in the order. Mr. Bennion, as a nonconsenting interest owner in the unit, 
could not then drill his own wells or produce his own oil and gas. The designated 
operator drill the designated well or wells for the drilling unit. The Tew 1-1B5 Well, 
the designated well in the Subject Drilling Unit, was drilled and completed as a 
producing well on July 7, 1974. 
In February 1975, Mr. Bennion sought an order pooling the interests in the 
Subject Drilling Unit pursuant to statute and establishing his rights to production 
payments and duties of paying costs for the well. The pooling order was entered by the 
Board in April, 1981 and stated that all interest in the Subject Drilling Unit were pooled 
as of July 26, 1979. As of the time the Tew 1-1B5 Well reached payout, Mr. Bennion 
was entitled to his percentage of production and was required to pay his percentage of 
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the costs of the operation of the well. Mr. Bennion's rights and duties vested in the 
unit, for the entire unit, at that time. 
In April of 1985, the Board, by Order in Cause No. 139-42, modified the existing 
unitization order so that an additional well could be drilled on the Subject Drilling Unit. 
The Miles 2-1B5 Well was drilled in the unit in February of 1990 as the increase density 
well for the Subject Drilling Unit. Rather than pay Mr. Bennion his share of the 
production and require Mr. Bennion to pay his share of the costs pursuant to the 
original unitization and pooling order, ANR attempted to contract with Mr. Bennion 
privately. Mr. Bennion refused and ANR petitioned the Board to modify the existing 
pooling order, and thus, require Mr. Bennion to pay an exorbitant amount for the costs 
of the drilling of the second well. Mr. Bennion's position as a nonconsenting interest 
owner under the original unitization and pooling orders has not changed. For the Board 
now to modify the existing pooling order and require Mr. Bennion to pay these 
exorbitant nonconsent penalties for the second well is a violation of the Declaration of 
Public Interest of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1983 amendment to the statute which provide the nonconsent penalty are 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case. Since the data which has been 
uncovered by Mr. Bennion shows that ANR was taking virtually no risk in drilling the 
second well, Mr. Bennion should not be assessed a nonconsent penalty pursuant to 
statute. The risk of drilling a dry hole must be investigated by the Board before the 
Board can arbitrarily assess a nonconsent penalty against a nonconsenting interest owner. 
The Board has not investigated the risks involved in drilling this second well in the 
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Subject Drilling Unit and therefore has arbitrarily and capriciously and without due 
process assessed Mr. Bennion a 175% penalty. This also amounts to a taking of Mr. 
Bennion's property without just compensation. 
The nonconsent penalty statute which the Board has used in modifying the 
original pooling order simply does not apply in this case. The statute only applies if 
there is a dispute as to the costs to be assessed to an owner. In this case, there is no 
dispute since Mr. Bennion was forced pooled by order of the Board in 1981 and that 
order applies to the entire unit. The original pooling order is still in effect and Mr. 
Bennion's rights and duties flow from the original forced pooling order as to the second 
well. The Board does not have the authority to now change the rights and duties of the 
parties which vested at the time the unit first began producing. The Board has also 
violated its own order which allowed for a second well to be drilled in the unit and also 
stated that in allowing the second well to be drilled, the Board would not and could not 
change the correlative rights and duties of the parties under the original unitization 
order. The Board has now modified the original order in violation of its own order and 
contrary to all law in the field of oil and gas. There is virtually no evidence to support 
the Board's modification of the pooling order and therefore the substantial evidence test 
has not been met. 
The Board's order in 1985 allowing for a second well to be drilled also required 
that the operator provide evidence of economic feasibility before the well was drilled. 
ANR as the operator for the unit did not do so. ANR provided no information to the 
Board and no information to Mr. Bennion regarding the economic feasibility or the risks 
it was taking in drilling the second well. Since Mr. Bennion was not given any 
information regarding the economic feasibility of the second well, he could not make an 
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informed decision about participating in the well as a consenting interest owner by 
contract with ANR. Mr. Bennion, therefore, chose to continue as a nonconsenting 
interest owner under the original forced pooling action. For the Board to now modify 
the original pooling order and force Mr. Bennion to pay 175% of the costs of drilling 
the second well is not only not supported by substantial evidence but is contrary to the 
Declaration of Public Interest of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. 
The Board's modification of the original pooling order is an abuse of discretion 
by the Board in that the modification is completely contrary to the Division's Statement 
of Public Interest protecting the correlative rights of the owners in the unit. The Board 
has arbitrarily and capriciously modified rights and duties which were vested at the time 
the unit was formed and which were vested at the time the original pooling order was 
made. There is no evidence in the record which would support the theory that this 
modification somehow protects the correlative rights of the owners. The statute which 
the Board has used in modifying the original pooling order is unconstitutional on its 
face. The nonconsent penalty provides that the Board may assess a penalty against a 
nonconsenting interest owner from 150% up to 200% for certain costs. When a well is 
not very productive this can amount to a taking of property without just compensation. 
For all of the above reasons, Mr. Bennion respectfully submits this Memorandum 
and requests that the Court overrule the Board's modification of the original Pooling 
Order and overrule its Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order in Cause 
No. 139-63. Mr. Bennion requests that he be allowed to continue as a nonconsenting 
interest owner under the original forced pooling order which requires him to pay his 
proportionate share of the costs of the drilling of the second well in the unit with no 
penalty. 
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DATED this<22rday of January, 1991. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
iR STII 
BARBARA &HtfMERMAN 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the<22*ttay of January, 1991, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was hand-delivered, to the 
following: 
JOHN P. HARRINGTON, Esq. 
ALAN A. ENKE, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for ANR Production Company 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THOMAS MITCHELL, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
ATTORNEYS FOR UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL, 
GAS AND MINING 
Three Triad Center, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
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ADDENDUM 
(A) Order in Cause No. 139-13 
(B) Order in Cause No. 139-42 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 
OF S. H. BENNION FOR AN ORDER 
POOLING INTEREST IN THE DRILLING 
UNIT COMPRISED OF SECTION 1, 
TOWNSHIP 2 SOUTH OF RANGE 5 WEST, 
UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN, DUCHESNE 
COUNTY, UTAH 
ORDER 
Cause No. 139-13 
This cause came on for hearing before the Board of 
Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, the State 
of Utah, at 10:00 a.m., on Thursday, July 26, 1979, in the 
Executive Conference Room, Holiday Inn, 1659 West North Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, pursuant to the Amended Application of 
S. H. Bennion ("Bennion") and to notice to all interested par-
ties duly and regularly given by the Board, to consider forced 
pooling of the uncommitted interest of Bennion in the above-
captioned drilling unit, and other matters as set forth in the 
Amended Application -and ^ Notice -of ^ Hearing. 
The following members of the Board were present: 
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman 
Edward T. Beck 
C. Ray Juvelin 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
John L. Bell 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B. Feight, Director 
Thalia R. Busby, Administrative Assistant 
Frank M. Hamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer 
Michael, Minder, Geological Engineer 
Denise A, Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General 
Appearances were made as follows: 
S. H. Bennion, for himself 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. H. Bennion 
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, State 
of Utah, on October 24, 1979, at the Wildlife Resources Audi-
torium, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Board members were present: 
Charles R. Henderson, Chairman 
John L. Bell 
C« Ray Juvelin 
E. Steele Mclntyre 
Constance K. Lundberg 
Edward T. Beck 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B, Feight, Director 
Thalia R« Busby, Administrative Assistant 
Frank M. Hamner, Chief Petroleum Engineer 
Michael Minder, Geological Engineer 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General 
Appearances were made as follows: 
S. H. Bennion, for himself 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. H. Bennion 
Don Gallion, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
This cause also came on for hearing before the Board 
of Oil, Gas and Mining, Department of Natural Resources, State 
of Utah, on December 18, 1980, at the Wildlife Resources Audi-
torium, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The following Board members were present: 
John L. Bell, Co-Chairman 
Charles Henderson 
Thadis W. Box 
E« Steele Mclntyre 
C. Ray Juvelin 
Also present and representing the Division: 
Cleon B. Feight, Director 
Ron Daniels, Coordinator 
Mike Minder, Petroleum Engineer 
Paula Frank, Secretary 
Denise A. Dragoo, Special Assistant Attorney General 
Appearances were made as follows: 
Peter Stirba, Counsel for S. H. Bennion 
Lowell Kirkpatrick, for Shell Oil Company 
Gregory P. Williams, Counsel for Shell Oil Company 
NOW, THERFORE, the Board, having considered the 
matters presented at said hearings and the remarks and the 
stipulations of counsel, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS 
1* That due and regular notice of the time, place, 
and purpose of said hearings was given to all interested par-
ties in the form and manner and within the time required by law. 
2. That the Board has jurisdiction over the matters 
covered by the Amended Application and all of the parties 
interested therein, and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate 
the Order hereinafter set forth. 
3. That Bennion is the record owner of an unleased, 
undivided one-fourth mineral interest in all oil, gas and min-
erals located in the NE% SW% and NW* SZk of Section 1, Township 
2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special Meridian, Duchesne 
County, Utah, 
4. That by Order in Cause No. 139-3, entered June 24, 
1971, as amended by Order in Cause No. 139-8, entered September 
20, 1972, the Board established said Section 1, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West, Unitah Special Meridian, as a drilling and 
spacing unit for the production of oil, gas, and associated 
hydrocarbons from the spaced interval described in said orders; 
that Shell Oil Company has drilled the TEW 1-1B5 well in said 
Section 1 which is producing from said interval and is the per-
mitted well for said drilling unit. 
5. That said Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 
West, Uintah Special Meridian, contains 678.2 acres; and that 
Bennion's interest in said drilling and spacing unit is a 
2.948981 interest. 
6. That Shell is the major working interest owner and 
is the sole operator within said drilling unit; and that Shell 
is willing to let Bennion share in the proceeds of production 
of said unit from first production. 
7. That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this 
cause dated March 26, 1980, all interests in the drilling unit 
comprised of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah 
Special Meridian, in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County, 
Utah, were pooled for the development and operation of said 
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights, 
effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979. 
8. That Bennion's proportionate share of the net rev-
enue from the production of the subject well up to 6:00 a.m., 
Mountain Daylight time on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41 which 
consists of the following: 
Working Interest Accumulations 
Revenue 
Oil $101,608.86 
Gas 3,482.23 
Total 105,091.09 
Expenditures 47f203.16 
NET $57,887.93 
Royalty Interest Accumulations* 
Oil $13,872.44 
Gas 462.04 
Total $14,334.48 
Total Accumulations 
Working Interest $57,887.93 
Royalty Interest 14,334.48 
Total $72,222.41 
(•Based on a one-eighth cost free royalty, proportionately re-
duced, until payout. Upon payout this royalty merges with and 
is included in the working interest.) 
9. That pursuant to the Board's Interim Order in this 
cause dated March 26, 1980, Shell paid the Division of Oil, Gas, 
and Mining the sum of $72,222.41 which sum was placed in a 
six-month money market certificate as directed by counsel for 
Bennion and Shell; that the original certificate earned inter-
est in the amount of $3,917.69? and that the original sum and 
interest were invested in a new certificate which bears inter-
est at the rate of 13.519% and will mature on May 6, 1981. 
10. That Bennion has conducted an audit of Shell's 
records relating to the subject well at Shell's offices in 
Houston, Texas, and has submitted a report relating to such 
audit to the Board. 
11* That it is the practice of the industry to con-
duct an audit of an operator's records at the office where the 
operator maintains such records; and that there are standard 
accounting procedures in the industry relating to such audits. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE BOARD: 
1, That all interests in the drilling unit comprised 
of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Uintah Special 
Meridian, in the Altamont Field of Duchesne County, Utah, be and 
the same are pooled for the development and operation of said 
drilling unit and for the protection of correlative rights, 
effective at 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979. 
2, That the TEW 1-1B5 well located in said Section 1 
is the permitted well for said drilling unit. 
3, That Bennion is entitled to receive from Shell 
Bennion's proportionate share of production of oil, gas liq-
uids, and natural gas in-kind produced from the subject well 
from and after 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time, July 26, 1979, 
upon payment of Bennion's proportionate share of the monthly 
operating expense of said well; that Shell will tender Bennion 
invoices for his proportionate share of the monthly operating 
expense in the same manner and in the same detail as if Bennion 
had signed the Operating Agreement in effect for said unit; 
that in the event Bennion fails to pay his proportionate share 
of the monthly operating expense within 15 days of invoice, 
Shell shall have a first and preferred lien on Bennion1s inter-
est in production and shall be entitled to withhold the amount 
of said production in an amount equal to Bennion's share of the 
operating expense plus interest at the prevailing rate until 
such payment is received? and that should such default continue 
for a period of ninety (90) days after receipt of invoice, Shell 
shall be entitled to retain Bennion's proportionate share of 
production to the extent of Shell's lien or to tender the pro-
duction withheld pursuant to Shell's lien to Bennion and pursue 
other available legal remedies. 
4. That Bennion's interest in said drilling unit is a 
2.94898% interest. 
5. That Bennion is not entitled to share in production 
occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain Daylight time on July 26, 
1979, in-kind but is entitled to share in the proceeds of such 
production; that the amount to which Bennion is entitled with 
respect to production occurring prior to 6:00 a.m., Mountain 
Daylight time on July 26, 1979, is $72,222.41; and that the Board 
shall transfer ownership of the money market certificate purchased 
pursuant to the Interim Order dated March 26, 1980, to Bennion. In 
addition, Shell shall pay Bennion the sum of $2,504.00, represent-
ing interest at 6 percent per annum on Bennion's statutory royalty 
interest for the period from first production until the purchase 
of the original money market certificate. 
6. That any further audit of Shell's records relating 
to the subject drilling unit which Bennion wishes to conduct 
shall be performed at Bennion's expense at the location at which 
such records are kept; and that any such audit shall be con-
ducted pursuant to the accounting procedures of the industry. 
DATED this ^  day of 0\o^L^. , 1981. 
'J 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
Charges R. Henderson, Chairman 
s>* : v * 
rd T. Bee* 
y 
u 
.^ 
John L. B e l l / 
Thadis W. Box 
,-/%r.hr /ffdLtZ* f. 
E. Steele Mclntyre j 
Robert R. Norman \ 
Margaret Bird 
EXHIBIT "B" 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE AMENDED 
PETITION OF AMR LIMITED I N C . , ^ 
ET AL. FOR AN ORDER MODIFYING'' 
PREVIOUS ORDERS WHICH 
ESTABLISHED DRILLING AND 
SPACING UNITS AND ANY OTHER 
ORDERS RELATING TO TEST WELLS ; 
FOR 'THE^CLTAMONT, BLUEBELL 
AND'.CEDAR-RIM-SINK DRAW 
FIELDS, DUCHESNE AND UINTAH' 
COUNTIES, UTAH 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e Amended N o t i c e of H e a r i n g d a t e d March 
4 , 1985 of t h e Board of O i l , Gas and Mining ("Board") , Depar tment 
of N a t u r a l R e s o u r c e s of t h e S t a t e of U t a h , s a i d cause came on f o r 
h e a r i n g on T h u r s d a y , A p r i l 1 1 , 1985 a t 1 0 : 0 0 a .m. i n t h e Beard 
Room of t h e D i v i s i o n of O i l , Gas and Mining ( " D i v i s i o n " ) , 355 
West N o r t h Temple , 3 T r i a d C e n t e r , S u i t e 3 0 1 , S a l t Lake C i t y , 
U t a h . 
The f o l l o w i n g members of t h e Boa rd were p r e s e n t : 
G r e g o r y P . W i l l i a m s , Chairman 
James W. C a r t e r 
C h a r l e s R. Henderson 
R i c h a r d B. La r son 
E. S t e e l e M c l n t y r e 
John M. G a r r , h a v i n g r e c u s e d h i m s e l f , 
d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Docke t Mo. 85-.0C7 
Cause No. 139-42 
Hark C. Hoench, Assistant Attorney General, was present 
on behalf of the Board. 
Members of the Staff of the Division present and 
participating in the hearing included: 
Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director 
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director 
John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer 
Barbara W. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, was 
present on behalf of the Division. 
Appearances were made as follows: Petitioners AKR 
Limited, £i ^1., by Frank Douglass, Esq, and Ray H. Langenberg, 
Austin, Texas; Robert. G. Pruitt, Jr., Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah; 
Frank J. Gustin, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah; Louis A. Posekany, 
Jr., General Counsel, and George W. Eellstrom, Esq., ANR 
Production Company; Phillip K. Chattin, General Counsel, Utex Oil 
Company; Eugh C. Garner, Esq., for Coastal Oil £ Gas Corporation; 
Phillip William Lear, Esq., for Phillips Petroleum Company? 
Jeffrey R. Young, Esq., for Bow Valley Petroleum, Inc.; B. J. 
Lewis, Esq., Vice President, and Robert W. Adkins, Esq., Linmar 
Energy Corporation; Robert Buettner, Esq., Koch Exploration 
Company; Lane Jamison, Esq., Sonat Exploration Company; Victor 
Brown and Robert Brown, Utah Royalty Association; John Harja, 
Esq., Gulf Oil Corporation; Martin Seneca, General Counsel, Ute-
Indian Tribe; Assad H. Raffoul, Petroleum Engineer, Bureau of 
Land Management; John Chasel, on his own behalf; George Korris, 
Esq., Ute Distribution Corporation; Dr. Gilbert Killer, 
Conservation Superintendent, Amarada Hess Corporation; and L". A. 
Pike, Roosevelt, Utah, landowner. 
Now therefore, the Board having considered the 
testimony of the witnesses, John C. Osmond, Petroleum Geologist; 
Clarke Gillespie, Petroleum Reservoir Engineer; and R. Thayne 
Robson, Economist, for Petitioners and B. J. Lewis, Vice 
President, and John W. Clark, Petroleum Engineer, for Linmar 
Energy Corporation, and the exhibits received at said hearing and 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FTMDTNCS OF FACT 
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and 
purpose of the hearing was given to a l l in te res ted par t ies , as 
required by law and the rules and regulat ions of the Board. 
2. The Board has j u r i s d i c t i o n over the matters covered 
by said not ice and over a l l p a r t i e s in te res ted there in and has 
j u r i s d i c t i o n to make and promulgate any order here inaf ter set 
for th , 
3 . The Board has h e r e t o f o r e en te red 640 ac re d r i l l i n g 
and spac ing o r d e r s for the Lower Green River/Wasatch Formation in 
Causes No. 1 3 9 - 3 , 139-4 , 1 3 9 - 5 , 139-8 , and 139-17 (Altamont: 
F i e l d ) , Causes No. 131-11 , 131-14 , 131-24 , 131-27 , 131-32 , 131-
3 3 , 131-34 , 131-45 and 131-55 , (Bluebe l l F i e l d ) , and Causes No. 
140-6 and 140-7 (Cedar Rim-Sink Draw F i e ld ) as t o t h e fo l lowing 
d e s c r i b e d l a n d s : 
UINTAH SPECIAL MERIDIAN 
Townshiip 1 Northf Rsrge 1 West 
Sect ions : 19-36 
Township I North, Range 7 West 
S e c t i o n s : 19-36 
Township 1 North, Rancp 3 West 
S e c t i o n s 23-26, 35 and 36 
Township 1 South. Ranne 1 Fast 
S e c t i o n s : All (except Roosevel t Unit) 
Township 1 South, Ranae 2 East 
S e c t i o n s : 4 - 8 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 30-31 
Township 1 South, Ranee 1 West 
S e c t i o n s : All (except Roosevel t Unit) 
Township 1 South, Range 7 through 4 West 
S e c t i o n s : Al l 
Township 1 South, Ranee 5 West 
S e c t i o n s : 10-17 , 20-36 
Township 1 South, Ranee 6 West 
S e c t i o n s : 25-26, 35-36 
Township 7 South, Range 1 through 7 Fast 
S e c t i o n s : Ail 
Township 7 South, Range 1 through 6 West 
S e c t i o n s : All 
Township 2 South, Ranee 7 West 
S e c t i o n s : 19, 30-36 
Township 2 South, Range R West 
S e c t i o n s : 23-26, 31-36 
Township 3 Southr Range 3 west 
S e c t i o n s : 5-S, 17 -20 , 29-32 
Township 3 South. Range 4 through R West 
S e c t i o n s : Al l 
Township i South, Range 3 West 
S e c t i o n s : 5 and 6 
Township 4 South. Range 4 West 
S e c t i o n s : 1-6 
Township 4 South. Range 5 West 
S e c t i o n s : 1-6 
Township 4 South, Range $ West 
S e c t i o n s : 1-18 
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Township 5 South. Range 19 East 
S e c t i o n s : 20-23 , 26 -29 , 32-35 
Township 6 South, Range 19 Fas t 
S e c t i o n s : 3 - 5 , 9 , 10 , 1 5 , 16 , 22, 27 
and 34 
4. In Cause No. 140-12 , t h e Board au tho r i zed t h e 
d r i l l i n g of t e s t or second w e l l s t h a t may only be produced 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y with the i n i t i a l we l l on t h e same d r i l l i n g u n i t . 
5 . The Lower Green Riv'er/Wasatch Formation under ly ing 
tne sub jec t f i e l d s c o n s t i t u t e s a pool as t h a t term i s defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §40-6-2(9) (1953, as amended), and i s a h ighly 
complex s e r i e s of i s o l a t e d and d i s con t i nuous beds of p roduc t ive 
rock t h a t a r e randomly d i s t r i b u t e d v e r t i c a l l y over a s e v e r a l 
thousand f e e t t h i c k i n t e r v a l . Normally, t he p roduc t ive beds are 
s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t and not in communication with each o t h e r . 
6. Many of the p r o d u c t i v e beds are not c o r r e l a t a b l e 
from wel l t o wel l and w i l l not a f ford coram uni ca t ion between we l l s 
as c lose as 1000 f e e t . Of t h e p r o d u c t i v e beds t h a t c o r r e l a t e , 
v a r i o u s g e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r s p reven t a s i g n i f i c a n t number form 
communicating between w e l l s w i t h i n t h e same s e c t i o n . 
7 . Geologic and e n g i n e e r i n g informat ion from i n i t i a l 
u n i t w e l l s and t e s t w e l l s show t h a t a s i n g l e wel l w i l l not 
e f f e c t i v e l y d r a i n the r e c o v e r a b l e o i l and gas under ly ing any 
given 640 a c r e spacing u n i t because t h e p roduc t ive beds a r e too 
small or have other limiting characteristics precluding effective 
and efficient drainage of the recoverable reserves underlying the 
unit. 
8. Data from production logs and field performance 
show that test wells drilled under the Order in Cause No. 140-12 
after 1978 have caused the recovery of substantial amounts of oil 
from separate and distinct productive beds and from previously 
undepleted productive beds, and that the drilling of additional 
wells on existing units jwill increase the ultimate_ recovery of^ 
oil_ from _the^subject fields. 
9. The prohibition of simultaneous production from the 
initial well and test well on the same unit has caused the 
shutting in of wells with the potential to produce ^ substantial 
amounts of additional reserves. 
10. Each additional well drilled under this order will 
tap producing formations that are separate and distinct from and 
not in communication with any other producing formation and is 
not an unnecessary well. 
11. In some areas of the subject fields, geologic, 
engineering, and economic factors justify drilling additional 
wells on existing units. In other areas, geologic, engineering 
and economic factors may not justify drilling additional wells on 
existing units. 
mwcT,nsTONS OP LAW 
1. Due and regular notice of -the time, place and 
purpose of the hearing was given to all interested parties as 
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board. 
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the matters covered 
by said notice and over all parties interested therein and has 
jurisdiction to make and promulgate any order hereinafter set 
forth. . 
3. The Board is authorized to modify its previous 
orders to permit additional wells to be drilled within 
established units under Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6(4) (1953, as 
amended). 
4. An order permitting (a) the drilling of additional 
wells on existing units as provided herein and (b) the 
simultaneous production of initial wells and additional wells 
will prevent the waste of hydrocarbons, prevent the drilling of 
unnecessary wells, and protect correlative rights. 
ORDER 
.IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
To prevent waste of oil, gas and associated liquid 
hydrocarbons, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, to 
protect correlative rights and to maintain, to the maximum extent 
practicable, drilling units of uniform size and shape for the 
promotion of more orderly development of the lands described in 
Finding of Fact No. 3 above, the following order is hereby 
promulgated to govern operations in said area effective as of 
"April 12, 19 85": 
A. Upon the effective date any and all orders of the 
Board heretofore promulgated which are inconsistent with the 
orders herein set forth shall be and are hereby vacated to the 
extent inconsistent herewith. 
B. Additional wells may be drilled, completed, and 
produced on established drilling units comprising government 
surveyed sections of approximately 640 acres (or other designated 
drilling units so long as such unit is at least 400 acres in 
size) to a density of no greater than two producing wells on each 
'unit comprising a section (or other designated unit). 
C. Additional wells may be drilled at the option of 
the operator of the unit, based upon geologic and engineering 
data for that unit which will justify the drilling of an 
additional well in order to recover additional oil, provided the 
additional well appears to be economically feasible. 
D. Economically feasible means that a prudent operator 
would have a reasonable opportunity to recover the costs of 
drilling, completing, producing and operating the well, plus a 
reasonable profit. 
£. It is not the intent of this order, in permitting 
additional wells to be drilled on established drilling units, to 
change or amend the existing contractual rights or relationships, 
express or implied, of any parties who share in production or the 
proceeds therefrom in the spaced area* 
F. Any additional well must be located at least 1,320 
feet from the existing well on' the unit and not closer than 660 
8-
feet from the exterior boundary of the unit. No two wells may be 
drilled in any drilling unit within the same governmental quarter 
section or equivalent lot.' 
G. If an operator elects to initially complete a veil 
solely within producing formations that are separate and distinct 
from and not in comjnunication with any other producing formation, 
the operator will use reasonable precautions in order that such 
well is not completed in any producing formation that may be 
effectively drained by any other well. 
E. Second or test wells drilled under previous orders 
as well as additional wells to'be drilled under this order may be 
produced simultaneously--with initial wells. 
I. The Board retains exclusive and continuing 
jurisdiction of all matters covered by this order and of all 
parties affected thereby and particularly that the Board retains 
and reserves exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to make 
further orders as appropriate and authorized by statute and 
appli cable re gu1 ati ons. 
ENTERED this l~\ —"day of >4 V n f 1985 • 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF O I L , GAS AND MINING 
LLIAHS, Chairman 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARK C. MOEKCH 
Assistant Attorney General 
ROOSEVELT UNIT 
Uintah County, Utah 
